ABSTRACT Botnets are widespread nowadays with the expansion of the Internet and commonly occur in many cyber-attacks, resulting in serious threats to network services and users' properties. With the rapid development of the Internet of Things (IoT) applications, the botnet can easily make use of IoT devices for larger-scale attacks. Domain name system (DNS) is widely used by the botnet to establish the connection between bots and their corresponding command-and-control (C&C). In order to avoid the track of the C&C through the DNS information, some sophisticated schemes are used by the botnet and fast-flux is a typical one. In this paper, the activities of Rustock botnet domain names which just use the fast-flux as the connection method between bots and C&C, are deeply analyzed from multiple aspects. Besides, we extract 32 special features of Rustock domain named querying traffic. Then multiple popular classifiers are adopted in order to pick the malicious domain names out from the DNS traffic using those 32 features. The work of this paper aims to provide guidance for future botnet detection based on real statics and experiments.
I. INTRODUCTION
Botnets are sets of devices (e.g., computers) which are infected with specific malicious software and then these devices can be remotely controlled to launch large-scale malicious attacks for example. With the rapid development and wide deployment of the Internet of Things (IoT), more insecure devices will be connected into the public Internet and they can be easily controlled by the botnets. Then IoT based botnet becomes one of the biggest security issues in the future Internet [1] .
In 2016, Dyn who is the most famous Domain Name System (DNS) service provider was attacked by the Distributed Denial of service (DDoS). The attacking traffic reached 1.2Tbps and brought down many notable websites including Twitter, Netflix, CNN and many others in Europe and the US. This event was caused by a botnet which was built out from a ragtag collection of IoT related devices. The botnet was comprised of all manner of Internet-connected devices from home routers to digital video recorders. On one hand,
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the IoT devices are always not be installed with sophisticated software to defense the botnet, and on the other hand, the IoT devices are always not been updated in time and then the vulnerabilities or bugs can be easily used by the botnet.
Using dynamic DNS, a botmaster which control the whole botnet can keep controlling the Command-andControl (C&C) server even when its current name cannot be accessed. Typically, the botmaster generates a series of domain names based on an algorithm and it can dynamically updates the location of C&C server with shifting the active DNS entry. Then the bots can always request the active domain name to access the C&C server to listen to the command even when the C&C server changed its location. Excepting the increased detection difficulty under dynamic DNS, bots will request the new IP address of the C&C server with the fresh domain name after the bots disconnected from the old C&C server, and this will result in an increase of DNS queries. In the recent years, newly generated botnet programs are more and more sophisticated [1] , [2] . The conventional schemes to detect a botnet using Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) or scanners are not effective enough. However, DNS is still widely used by botnet to establish the communication between bots and C&C server. That means the botnet activities could probably be detected by analyzing DNS requests and responses. In order to avoid being tracked, botnet always adopts fast-flux, which is a DNS technique used to bind numerous IP addresses associated with a single fully qualified domain name, where the IP addresses are swapped in and out with extremely high frequency, through changing DNS records. Furthermore, double-flux extends based on fast-flux to change domain name and IP address at the same time. With the fast-flux technology, the botnet always registers and uses multiple IP addresses and even domain names to hide the C&C server. Years ago, we discovered that the Rustock botnet also makes use of domain names under .CN Top Level Domain (TLD). And since then, we started the research of the Rustock domain name behavior with the .CN TLD log data. In this work, we deeply analyze the botnet domain name characteristics using DNS log data corresponding to the Rustock domain names under .CN TLD. Then we find some regular anomalies of the botnet DNS resolution (e.g. hostname, resource record, recursive server load). The contributions of the work are two-fold: 1) To summarize and reveal the resolution rules of the Rustock domain names.
2) To propose the key characteristics of the botnet domain names and test the detection performance with multiple machine learning algorithms.
In the following, we firstly present the related work on the botnet detection schemes in Section 2. Then we analyze the Rustock domain name behaviors in Section 3. Based on these analysis, we adopt some classifiers to detect the botnet domain names in Section 4. And we conclude this paper in Section 5 finally.
II. RELATED WORKS
In 2007, the first seminar on botnets was hold. Since then, the community keeps trying to propose different solutions in order to detect the botnet accurately and efficiently and some typical systems also have been established (e.g. BotHunter by Gu et al. [3] ). The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) Security and Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC) [4] has also released the report which presented the related DNS technique used by botnet. In the recent years, some researchers focused on the analysis of botnet traffic in order to detect the botnets timely and dispose them more efficiently. The detection schemes can be classified into two types: passive detection schemes and active detection schemes. The passive detection schemes require the process of accumulation, detection and reaction of evidence and they may use the following typical approaches: 1) Packet inspection approaches: based on the pre-defined model of the botnet, these approaches will match the characteristics of packets such as port number and payload.
2) DNS-based approaches: based on the fact that bots may launch DNS queries to detect and access the C&C server, DNS monitoring is used as an efficient manner to detect botnet [5] - [12] . However, these past works mainly focus on monitor-based traffic features related with botnet. The DNS behaviors should be analyzed from the specific authoritative server because the traffic information is distributed in multiple resolvers. In addition, the features from different aspects, such as name structure and registered Resource Records (RRs), should be considered simultaneously. And that is just the motivation of our work.
3) Honeypot: it is defined as an environment where vulnerabilities can be deliberately infected in order to observe attacks and intrusions [13] .
Active detection schemes are mainly used to dispose or cutoff botnet behavior and there are the following two kinds of active detection approaches: 1) Sink holing: it is an approach to cutoff the controller and bots for example with the hijack of the botnet domain names.
2) Infiltration: based on the extraction of the botnet protocol messages, the protocol reverse-engineering can be executed accordingly and then the defense against botnet can be implemented actively.
In our work, we focus on the deep analysis of the botnet domain name characteristics and then try to detect the botnet domain names efficiently and accurately. In this way, the botnet domain names can be filtered out and the resolution can be immediately suspended. And the work in this paper is an extension based on our previous achievement with extended feature analysis and expanded dataset in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of these features and detect the botnet domain name more effectively.
III. RUSTOCK DOMAIN NAME ANALYZING
In order to deeply study the characteristics of the botnet domain names, we collect malicious domain name log data from the .CN authoritative server. In order to dispose the botnet, the authoritative server redirects all the request domain name queries of Rustock .CN domain names to a blackhole server. Blackhole server is used to the redirect the resolutions of the botnet domain names to an unreachable destination and then the connection between bots and the C&C server can be broken. For eample, blackhole server, as the ''disguised'' authoritative server of the botnet domain names, can respond with local loopback address (127.0.0.1) to the recursive server and finally the bots. And then the Rustock domain name related log data can be filtered out although the resolvers are distributed. We collect the querying log for two weeks in this study, which contains about 140 distinct malicious domain names.
The distribution of DNS query popularity usually follows Zipf's law (distribution of popular names follow the Zipf's law, meaning a small fraction of the names are queried large fractions of the time). Rustock domain names are no exceptions as shown in Fig. 1 .
For the .CN TLD, about 2 dozen Rustock domain names are generated every day. In the following studies, we mainly focus on the names generated during two continuous weeks. And in the following, we list some special characteristics of the Rustock domain names from multiple aspects, such as the features related with the name structure, resolution source, and daily resolution amount and so on.
A. MEANINGFUL LENGTH RATIO
In order to guarantee the successful registration rate, the botnet domain names are almost random strings with mixed letters and numbers. In order to evaluate the ''randomness'' of these malicious domain names generated by the program, we propose an index, namely Meaningful Length Ratio (MLR), which is the proportion between the character number of longest successive letter string or Arabic number string and the total length of the domain name.
MLR = Length of successive letters or numbers Length of full name
Then the MLR of some Rustock domain names are shown in Table 1 .
B. QUERYING TYPE
RRs in DNS are used to map different kinds of information to the domain name, such as the serving IPv4/IPv6 address, resolution server name, owner key and so on. Then the end-user can fetch wanted information when the RR is specified by the querying type in the request message.
For each fresh name in Rustock botnet, only four kinds of query types exist at most and they are A, NS, MX and AAAA. Their percentages are listed in Table 2. DNS is used by the bots to track the C&C server dynamically and then the A record is mainly used as it maps the domain name to the IPv4 address. It can be anticipated, with the increased deployment of IPv6, AAAA record will also be widely used by the botnet to map the domain name to the IPv6 address of the C&C server.
C. QUERIES PER RECURSIVE SERVER
We define a new metric in this paper as Queries per Recursive server (QPR) as
where Total_queries and Total_sources denote the total queries per day and the total sources after reduplication removal, respectively. The sources of DNS queries may be not a real recursive server because the client can directly send the query messages to the authoritative server in the rare cases.
The results are shown in Table 3 .
As shown in Table 3 , the 12 domain names have the similar QPR values. Besides, the value is very small because the domain name is only queried from each related recursive server twice or so. This implies the popularity of the .CN Rustock domain name and the infected density. In order to illustrate the differences between the Rustock domain names and the benign .CN names, we show the comparison results in Fig. 2 .
As shown in Fig. 2 , the Rustock domain names have similar QPR, while the QPR values corresponding to the benign names have a high randomness.
D. QUERIES PER HOUR
In order to present the behaviors of the botnet domain names, we analyzed their Queries per Hour (QPH).
In Fig. 3 , we compare the QPH between the botnet domain name and the typical benign domain name. They are marked as malicious-ex.cn and benign-ex.cn, respectively. As shown, the botnet domain names are mainly used for the connection between the bots and the C&C server and then the domain name queries are controlled by the program. In this way, even during the same day, the queries of botnet domain names have obvious peak and valley. However, the benign domain names provide consist services and then the queries of the domain names are very smooth.
E. CHANGE POINTS OF QUERIES
Most botnet programs are designed to periodically query a C&C to fetch the newly generated commands in order to execute malicious behaviors, such as DDoS attacks, sending spam or phishing emails.
Then the active bots behaviors are always started with the domain name resolution to access the C&C server. This problem can be modeled as a Change Point Detection (CPD) problem [14. 15] which can present the sudden change point for the timing sequenced events. Then we use a cumulative sum (CUSUM) to construct the timing sequence events of the botnet domain name queries [16] .
Concretely, the procedure is as follows: the whole timeline is cut into ordered sequences with same value t. For each t, the average traffic volume for previous ε intervals is calculated as P − t and the average traffic volume for subsequent ε intervals is calculated as P + t . Then the distance between P − t and P + t can be calculated as d(t) which is the Euclidean Distance between two related vectors.
The ordered sequence of d(t) values is the input of the CUSUM algorithm. Intuitively, a change point is a time interval t for which d(t) is sufficiently large.
The precision with which a change point can be located also depends on the length of the time intervals. Shorter intervals increase the precision. Unfortunately, they also increase the probability that small traffic variations (e.g., bursts) are misinterpreted as a change point. This could introduce unwanted noise into the subsequent model generation process. We set t to be 3600 seconds and set ε to be 8 hours here based on the insight that a whole day can be split into three periods: working time, evening and night. The comparison between Rustock domain names and benign domain names is shown in Fig. 5 . As illustrated, the querying amounts of botnet domain names are relatively fixed because the bot number is a fixed value during a period. However, there are two sudden behavioral changes. At the point 3, the increased point appears, and the decrease point is 9. The figure of malicious domain names looks smooth because we set the period to be 8 hours and the short time change can be polished [17] . However, the benign domain names are continuously queried and have multiple change points as shown in Fig. 4 .
F. SIMILARITY BETWEEN DAILY BEHAVIORS
Furthermore, we calculate the Euclidean Distance of the traffic volumes between every two successive days [18] and denote it as Queries per Day (QPD). Each day starts at 00:00 am and finishes at 23:59 pm. We assume that a domain name has been queried within n days, and d i,j is the Euclidean Distance between the queries in the i th day and j th day. Then D is calculated as the average of (n − 1) × (n − 2)/2 different distance pairs:
We show the daily behavior of botnet domain names and benign domain names in Fig.5 . As shown in Fig. 5 , the live time of the Rustock .CN domain names is about 3 days and then the querying amount decreased to about zero.
We calculate the normalized Euclidean distance as the result of D divided by the maximum QPD value within the same 7 days. The comparison between Rustock domain names and benign domain name is shown in Fig. 6 . As shown, the normalized Euclidean distance of the benign domain name is very low compared with the malicious domain names.
G. SUMMARY OF THE RUSTOCK DOMAIN NAME BEHAVIORS
From the above analysis, we can summarize the following behavioral rules of the Rustock domain names: Rustock domain names are always generated randomly with a mixture of letters and number and then the ''meaningful length ratio'' is low.
C&C detection depends on MX and NS records to identify the name of the server for mail service and DNS authoritative name resolution. A and AAAA records are mainly used RRs in order to find the location of the related server.
The Rustock domain names are requested by the infected bots and then the querying quality and sources are relatively fixed for each domain name. Besides, the infected bots trigger the Rustock domain names based on the same botnet program and then different names have similar querying pattern.
The Rustock domain names are only active for a short period and then disappear.
IV. BOTNET DOMAIN NAME DETECTION
The botnet domain name detection model is shown in Fig. 7 . The detection model involves taking features extracted from the DNS resolution records and using them to classify domain names automatically. This is done by developing classification algorithms that use the feature information. To develop a classification algorithm, we need to divide the log file data into two types:
• Training set: to develop the classification scheme • Detecting set: to test the classification scheme Both the training and the detecting sets should represent the domain names that can be differentiated correctly. After the data have been divided, it is possible to work on the development of the classification algorithm. We will not compare the related works here [5] - [12] because the most important motivation of this work is to deeply and comprehensively analyze the botnet domain name characteristics. Then we adopt different classifiers based on our refined features to verify that the features are effective and niche targeting in order to detect the botnet domain name even under different classifiers.
A. FEATURES
Based on our studies of the DNS log data of botnet domain name resolution, we extracted 32 features of botnet domain names as shown in Table 4 .
B. TRAINING DATASET
Usually, the quality of the training set has significant impact on the performance of a machine learning algorithm [19] . Thus, we on one hand require a training set that contains representative samples of benign and malicious domain names, on the other hand, the dataset should also be large enough to cover all the features in order to demonstrate their combined performance.
We collect the DNS querying log data from .CN authoritative server for two weeks, which contains about 140 Rustock botnet domain names. For the benign domain name samples, the number should be large enough to represent the actual situation. Then we randomly select 23060 benign .CN domain names and separate them into 140 levels according to their querying volumes per day.
C. CLASSIFICATION ALGORITHMS
We adopt four popular classifiers in our work to test the effectiveness of the botnet domain name detection: Adaboost [20] , Bagging [21] , Naive Bayes [22] and k-Nearest Neighbors (k-NN) [23] .
D. DETECTION RESULTS
We mainly use Precision, Recall, and F-Measure (defined as following) as three performance indexes to evaluate the performance of the detection results: 
Recall
where ''TP'' denotes the correctly classified botnet names, ''TN'' denotes the correctly classified benign names, ''FP'' denotes the benign names misclassified as botnet names, and ''FN'' denotes the botnet names misclassified as benign names. Because this is a typical imbalanced classification problem, we further use the ROC Area [24] to evaluate the performance. Three-fold cross-validation is run on the collected dataset and the result is shown in Table 5 . The results show that Adaboost, Bagging and k-NN have high accuracy on this matter and only rare negative instances are misclassified. The reason behind it is that the characteristics of botnet domain names are obvious, compared with the benign domain names. Naive Bayes has unsatisfactory performance, which is probably because the ratio of Rustock domain names within the whole dataset is very low. This phenomenon also happens in other class-imbalance classification problems, such as text categorization [25] .
As shown above, Adaboost, Bagging and k-NN have good performance on the fixed dataset. In order to further test their performance based on the proposed features in the real dataset, we monitored the log data of the authoritative server for three days. The daily average numbers of detected Rustock domain names were 18, 19, and 20, while about 3-6 false detections corresponding to the three classifiers. It illustrates that the real environment is more complex, and we still need to explore more sophisticated detection model which can well combine the proposed method with other schemes not using DNS.
E. DISCUSSIONS
Do more scale features mean better performance? The Classification results in Table 5 shows that k-NN, Bagging and Adaboost all achieved good results, especially k-NN algorithm, which correctly classified all the samples. It seems that it's unnecessary to extract more scale features. As we all know that more features mean that the efficiency of model detection will be reduced. In addition, it may lead to over-fitting or to another disadvantageous situation. In fact, we extracted another two different types of features: 1) domain name string characteristics, including the length of the domain name which illustrates whether it contains numbers and words; and 2) the operation characteristics of the domain name, including the number of name servers, the response speed of PING and so on. The results show that the log-based features extracted in this paper, after fusing these two kinds of features, have decreased performance under k-NN, Bagging and Adaboost. It means there are conflicts between the features. From the current experimental point of view, the features extracted in this paper have a better practicability.
Are the 32 extracted features particularly suitable for the constructed dataset? Whether there are too few Botnet samples? In future work, we will focus on these issues. In addition to the above ones, we believe that botnet recognition is potentially important based on the characteristics of timing log analysis, such as changes in the number of visits to domain names over days. In the future, we will validate it on larger datasets.
V. CONCLUSION
Fast-flux is a technique used by cyber-criminals to hide critical hosts behind an ever-changing set of compromised hosts. In this paper, we deeply analyzed the characteristics of botnet domain name resolution activities from multiple aspects. The results showed that only four DNS querying types were used by the Rustock domain name resolution and the amount of A type RR dominates among them. For the querying density, Rustock domain names have very low and fixed values. Besides, Rustock domain names only have two change points and the benign domain names have multiple change points for 24 hours. In addition, the lifetime of Rustock domain was very short and caused an obvious distance for the daily behaviors. We also extracted 32 features as the input of four popular classifiers to detect the Rustock domain names. In our future work, we will deploy this model under larger DNS data size and use more sophisticated learning algorithms to detect the malicious domain names for protecting critical infrastructure [26] , [27] . 
